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INTRODUCTION

The court has decided—your client prevails, and judgment is
entered. But, for many successful litigants this only marks the
beginning of a new struggle for compensation. Indeed, judgment
creditors are often surprised by how difficult it can be to enforce the
judgments they have painstakingly fought to obtain. In many cases,
judgment debtors attempt to conceal assets and frustrate their
judgment creditors by creating sham corporations,1 transferring
funds to shareholders and third parties, or even engaging in
complex multilayered transactions.2
Judgment creditors possess statutory remedies to aid in the
execution of their judgments, often referred to as supplemental
proceedings.3 However, the permissible scope of these proceedings
varies significantly based upon the law of the jurisdiction in which
the creditor’s judgment was entered.4 There are two particularly
controversial remedies that often arise in an enforcement context:
piercing the corporate veil5 and avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances.6 State legislatures and interpreting courts have taken
* J.D. June 2017, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois, B.A. in
Philosophy and Classics May 2012, New York University, New York, New York. This
comment would not have been possible without the unwavering support of my wife,
Lauren. Thank you for always being there for me.
1. A sham corporation, also known as a shell corporation, typically refers to a
corporation that operates as a mere facade for the operations of a dominant
shareholder. 114 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 403 (2010); BP Envtl. Servs., Inc. v.
Republic Servs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 (E.D. Pa. 2013); In re Canopy Fin.,
Inc., 477 B.R. 696, 703 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (applying Delaware law).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302–03
(3d Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court’s decision that that a particularly complex
series of mortgage transactions by a tax debtor, including a leveraged buyout, fell
within the meaning of a fraudulent transfer under the Pennsylvania Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act).
3. Supplemental proceedings are “a continuation of the creditor’s original action
against the debtor.” DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 60 (3d ed. 1987) (citing Mitchell v. Godsey, 53 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 1944)).
4. Each state has its own unique statutes relating to supplemental proceedings,
which are incorporated into federal cases through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
69(a), which provides in pertinent part as follows: “The procedure on execution—and
in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord
with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute
governs to the extent it applies.” FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a).
5. “Piercing the corporate veil” is commonly defined as “[a] Judicial process
whereby [a] court will disregard usual immunity of corporate officers from liability
for wrongful corporate activities; e.g., when incorporation exists for sole purpose of
perpetrating fraud.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1147–48 (6th ed. 1990).
6. The essence of the term “fraudulent conveyance” is captured well by the
following definition from the Internal Revenue Manual: “[W]hen real or personal
property is transferred to a third party with the object or the result of placing the
property beyond the reach of the creditor or hindering the creditor’s ability to collect
a valid debt.” I.R.M. § 5.17.14.2.3.2(3) (Jan. 24, 2012). More generally, they “may be
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a number of different approaches to the question of whether these
remedies should be available within a supplemental proceeding.7
Piercing the veil, the most frequently litigated issue in
corporate law,8 is an equitable remedy9 which holds a corporation
liable for the wrongful acts of its shareholders. 10 In an enforcement
context, it is an especially powerful form of relief that can undo
much of the damage resulting from a corporate debtor’s fraudulent
attempts to conceal assets in shareholders or third parties. 11
Despite the obvious utility of veil piercing to judgment creditors,
many courts have been reluctant to pierce corporate veils in the
context of supplemental proceedings, citing due process and
jurisdictional concerns.12 Thus, in most states, a judgment creditor
will usually be forced to initiate an entirely new case (bearing all
attendant costs), in order to attempt to pierce the corporate veil and
enforce its judgment.13 There are a few exceptions to this general
rule, however, including the law in the states of Florida and
Minnesota.14
roughly defined as an infringement of the creditor’s right to realize upon the
available assets of the debtor.” GARRARD GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES § 1 (1931). The ability to avoid fraudulent conveyances is an
important remedy to judgment creditors seeking to recover funds previously
transferred by judgment debtors to third parties. By holding the transferee liable for
the value of the transferred property, a judgment creditor can largely reverse the
deleterious effect of the judgment debtor’s fraudulent transfer.
7. Compare, e.g., Sanchez v. Renda Broad. Corp., 127 So. 3d 627, 628–29 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (interpreting Florida law as allowing for both veil piercing and
fraudulent transfer avoidance in supplemental proceedings), with Reyes-Fuentes v.
Shannon Produce Farm, Inc., No. 6:08-CV-59, 2012 WL 3562399, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Aug.
13, 2012) (interpreting Georgia law as permitting neither veil piercing nor fraudulent
transfer avoidance without filing new action).
8. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991).
9. “Pierc[ing] the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause
of action.” In re Gulf States Long Term Acute Care of Covington, LLC, 487 B.R. 713,
722 n.38 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2013) (citing Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354 (1996);
Grothues v. IRS, 226 F.3d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 2000)); accord Fontana v. TLD Builders,
Inc., 840 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
10. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1147–48 (defining piercing the
corporate veil).
11. For example, in Flushing Plaza Assocs. No. 2 v. Albert, 958 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013), the New York Supreme Court pierced the veil of a debtor
corporation that breached a lease with the plaintiff and then transferred money to
its controlling shareholder, which left it judgment-proof, all while continuing to
collect subtenant rents unimpeded.
12. Most notably, the United States Supreme Court rejected extending federal
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over third parties not already liable for the
underlying judgment. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 358.
13. See, e.g., Green v. Ziegelman, 767 N.W.2d 660, 665–68 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)
(interpreting Michigan law to require filing of new action to find liability of thirdparty corporation); Pyshos v. Heart-Land Dev. Co., 630 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (finding Illinois law to require the same).
14. See Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29 (interpreting Florida law to allow for veil
piercing in supplemental proceedings); accord Guava LLC v. Merkel, No. A15-0254,
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Another remedy judgment creditors often pursue is the
avoidance of fraudulent transfers. These situations arise when a
judgment creditor learns that the judgment debtor conveyed assets
to a third party, either before or after trial, in an effort to avoid
enforcement.15 In contrast to veil piercing, several state
legislatures, as well as federal courts, have been willing to allow
judgment creditors to implead third parties in supplemental
proceedings in order to avoid fraudulent conveyances those third
parties may have received from judgment debtors. 16 Other states,
however, have not been as flexible. 17 Thus, the current landscape of
supplemental proceedings is nebulous, with judgment creditors
often left wondering how to proceed in enforcing their judgment
against clever judgment debtors.
This comment will highlight the advantages of consolidating
fraudulent transfer avoidance claims and piercing actions within
supplemental proceedings, particularly with respect to the
important goals of promoting judicial economy and the successful
collection of judgments. To begin this analysis, Section II of this
comment will provide a background of the legislative enactments
and judicial holdings of several jurisdictions which, in the author’s
opinion, are representative of the existing differences in the
permissible scope of supplemental proceedings.
These jurisdictions have been divided into three groups: (1)
jurisdictions with supplemental proceedings that allow for both
fraudulent conveyance and piercing actions, of which Florida 18 and
Minnesota19 (“Group 1”) are clear examples; (2) jurisdictions that
only allow for the avoidance of fraudulent conveyances within
supplemental proceedings (and not piercing), which include

2015 WL 4877851, at *4–6 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2015) (similarly interpreting
Minnesota law to permit veil piercing in supplemental proceedings).
15. See definition of fraudulent transfers referenced supra note 6.
16. See, e.g., Woodridge Hills Ass’n v. Williams, No. 300193, 2011 WL 6378813,
at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2011) (interpreting Michigan law to allow impleading
of third parties into supplemental proceeding for purposes of fraudulent transfer
avoidance); Epperson v. Entm’t Express, Inc., 242 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that Connecticut law allows for fraudulent transfer avoidance through the
impleading of transferees in supplemental proceedings).
17. For example, the Georgia statute does not provide for any postjudgment relief
for fraudulent conveyance avoidance without filing a new action. See Reyes-Fuentes,
2012 WL 3562399, at *6.
18. See Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 56.29 (2014)).
19. See Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *5 (interpreting MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.833, subdiv. 1(3)(i) (2015)).
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Michigan,20 Illinois,21 Connecticut,22 and Alaska23 (“Group 2”); and
(3) jurisdictions that have prohibited both piercing and fraudulent
conveyance actions in supplemental proceedings, namely Georgia 24
and New York25 (“Group 3”).
After reviewing the relevant statutes and decisions in these
three groups of jurisdictions, Section III of this comment will
compare and contrast each group’s interpretation of whether
fraudulent conveyance avoidance and veil piercing ought to be
permissible in supplemental proceedings. Each jurisdiction will be
evaluated upon two criteria: (1) how the jurisdiction’s laws affect
judicial economy;26 and (2) whether the jurisdiction’s laws aid or
impair judgment creditors’ ability to successfully enforce and collect
their judgments. Section III will also provide additional detail
pertaining to the due process concerns raised by each jurisdiction’s
supplemental proceedings.27

20. In the case of Green, 767 N.W.2d 660 at 665–68, the Michigan Appellate Court
held that Michigan law did not permit a judgment creditor to pierce the corporate
veil of a third party, to whom no fraudulent transfer was alleged to have been made.
In contrast, Michigan law does permit the avoidance of fraudulent transfers to third
parties by the judgment debtor, considering them to be the property of the judgment
debtor subject to enforcement. Woodridge Hills Ass’n, 2011 WL 6378813, at *3; MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 600.6116, .6134 (2015).
21. See Pyshos, 630 N.E.2d at 1058 (forcing veil-piercing actions against third
parties to be pursued through a new action); see also Star Ins. Co. v. Risk Mktg.
Group Inc., 561 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2009) (interpreting Illinois law to allow for
the impleading of fraudulent transferees in a supplemental proceeding).
22. See Epperson, 242 F.3d at 104 (holding that under Connecticut law, a
fraudulent conveyance avoidance action was a simple mechanism, and permissible
in the context of a supplemental proceeding, but also explicitly noting that its ruling
did not extend to piercing actions).
23. See Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust v. Buster, 95 F.3d 1449, 1459–
60 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that under Alaska law, a judgment debtor’s impleading
of a third-party transferee to a fraudulent conveyance was permissible in a
supplemental proceeding, even though the transferee was not a party to the
underlying action).
24. See Reyes-Fuentes, 2012 WL 3562399, at *6 (finding Georgia law to require
the filing of a new action to avoid postjudgment fraudulent transfers or to pierce
corporate veil of a third party.)
25. The state of New York has a unique enforcement mechanism for
postjudgment collection, known as a special proceeding. Nevertheless, this statutory
mechanism still requires an entirely new case be initiated in order to establish thirdparty liability for fraudulent transfers. See Wasserman Media Grp., 2012 WL
1506181, at *3.
26. I.e., how each jurisdiction’s laws affect the management and conservation of
limited judicial resources, such as by consolidating related proceedings for
disposition by one judge. See Alvarez v. United States, 465 F.2d 373, 374 (5th Cir.
1972) (“In these days of crowded dockets, judicial economy compels the use of any
knowledge of the facts or other expertise which a judge may have acquired in his
prior contacts with a litigant.”).
27. For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Peacock, 516 U.S. 349, was
largely based upon a concern for the due process rights of third parties to an ancillary
enforcement action. How to best preserve these rights is an integral question to any
proposed expansion to supplemental jurisdiction.
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Upon completing a detailed comparison of each jurisdiction’s
supplemental proceedings, Section IV of this comment will argue
that there is a need for greater homogeneity and efficiency in
supplemental proceedings. In furtherance of these goals, Section IV
proposes the legislative enactment of stronger statutes allowing for
plaintiffs to avoid fraudulent transfers by debtors and pierce
corporate veils directly through supplemental proceedings. Section
IV will also address potential solutions to the due process concerns
that may arise from broadening the scope of supplemental
proceedings. Finally, Section V will briefly summarize the benefits
of permitting veil piercing and fraudulent conveyance actions to be
litigated directly in supplemental proceedings.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Group 1—Jurisdictions with Supplemental
Proceedings That Allow for Both Veil Piercing and
Fraudulent Transfer Avoidance
1. Florida
Florida is an instructive jurisdiction to consider in the area of
judgment enforcement, in light of its large repertoire of available
remedies to judgment creditors. In particular, section 56.29 of the
Florida Statutes governs supplemental proceedings in the state of
Florida, which the statute refers to as “proceedings
supplementary.”28 Under section 56.29, a judgment creditor
initiates supplemental proceedings after the entry of judgment by
simply filing an affidavit stating that the judgment is valid and
outstanding.29 Considered an equitable remedy, Florida courts
liberally construe section 56.29 with the intention of “afford[ing] the
judgment creditor with the most complete relief possible.” 30
Florida’s supplemental proceedings are exceptionally flexible
in comparison to other jurisdictions. To this end, Florida courts have
consistently permitted both veil-piercing actions and fraudulent
conveyance actions to be maintained against impleaded third
parties, irrespective of whether the third party was a litigant to the
underlying prejudgment cause of action. 31 Remarkably, a judgment
creditor is not even required to allege a fraudulent transfer in order
28. FLA. STAT. § 56.29 (2014).
29. FLA. STAT. § 56.29(1).
30. Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29 (quoting Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1112
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Amjad Munim, M.D., P.A. v. Azar, 648 So. 2d 145, 151
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
31. See Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29 (finding that a judgment creditor was
permitted to directly implead the sole shareholder of an asset-less corporate
judgment debtor into supplemental proceedings where the debtor deceived the
judgment creditor into entering into a lease without having the capacity to perform).
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to implead a third party to the supplemental proceeding or to veil
pierce.32 However, a Florida judgment creditor must still allege
improper conduct on the part of either the judgment debtor or the
party sought to be impleaded in order to pierce a corporate veil in
supplemental proceedings.33 Although the mere use of a corporate
alter ego is not in of itself improper conduct under Florida law, 34 it
may rise to that level when coupled with evidence of fraud,
deception, or illegal acts.35
Ultimately, Florida courts emphasize the importance of
facilitating judgment enforcement in supplemental proceedings.
Nevertheless, Florida tempers the flexibility of its supplemental
proceedings with requirements that judgment creditors allege
improper conduct on the part of any parties sought to be implead. 36
The result of this balancing act is an uncommon and fresh extension
to the scope of supplemental proceedings.
2. Minnesota
Section 322B.833, subdivision 1(3)(i) of the Minnesota Statutes
sets forth the available remedies for judgment creditors in
supplemental proceedings in the state of Minnesota. 37 Minnesota
has interpreted this statue broadly with respect to the available
relief to judgment creditors of corporations and LLCs in
supplemental proceedings.38
A Minnesota court may grant “any equitable relief it considers
just and reasonable in the circumstances,” in a supplemental action
by a judgment creditor whose claim has been returned unsatisfied. 39
32. The Sanchez court stated this proposition as follows: “The [Florida] statute
does not require the judgment creditor to allege a fraudulent transfer in order to use
proceedings supplementary aid in the execution of its judgment. . . . [T]here is
authority to support the use of proceedings supplementary to pierce the corporate
veil absent an allegation of a fraudulent transfer.” Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 629 (citing
Ocala Breeders’ Sales Co. v. Hialeah, Inc., 735 So. 2d 542, 543–44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999)).
33. See Rashdan v. Sheikh, 706 So. 2d 357, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(reversing judgment against impleaded defendant due to “absence of any allegations
or evidence of fraud, fraudulent transfer or other improper conduct on the part of
either [the impleaded defendant] or his professional association, [the judgment
debtor]”); see also Ocala, 735 So. 2d at 543 (permitting impleading of third-party
parent corporation in supplemental proceeding for its use of judgment debtor
subsidiary to “mislead creditors or to perpetrate a fraud upon them.”).
34. Geigo Props., L.L.P. v. R.J. Gators Real Estate Grp., 849 So. 2d 1109, 1110
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
35. Dania Jai–Alai Place, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114, 1117 (Fla. 1984)
(“[C]ourts will look through the screen of corporate entity to the individuals who
compose it in cases in which the corporation was a mere device or sham . . . to evade
some statute or to accomplish some fraud or illegal purpose.”).
36. Rashdan, 706 So. 2d at 357.
37. MINN. STAT. § 322B.833, subdiv. 1(3)(i) (2015).
38. Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *4.
39. Id.
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Minnesota courts have explicitly clarified that this includes this veil
piercing, which is considered an equitable remedy, 40 and not an
independent cause of action.41 Thus, section 322B.833, subdivision
1(3)(i) has been construed to permit the direct impleading of a third
party in a supplemental proceeding.42
In addition, fraudulent transfers by the judgment debtor to a
third party can also be directly avoided in a supplemental
proceeding in Minnesota.43 This policy is in agreement with the
broad enforcement powers granted under Minnesota law, and the
general principles behind judgment execution. 44 Thus, Minnesota
provides another excellent example of a jurisdiction where the
available remedies to judgment creditors in supplemental
proceedings have been expanded.

B. Group 2—Jurisdictions with Supplemental
Proceedings That Allow for Only Fraudulent Transfer
Avoidance (and Not Veil Piercing)
1. Michigan
Sections 600.6101 through 600.6143 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws and Michigan Court Rule 2.621 address supplemental
proceedings in the state of Michigan. 45 Notably, section 600.6104(2)
of the Michigan Compiled Laws allows Michigan courts to
“[p]revent the transfer of any property, money, or things in action,
or the payment or delivery thereof to the judgment debtor.” 46
Further, section 600.6104(5) gives the court discretion to “[m]ake
any order as within his [the judge’s] discretion seems appropriate
in regard to carrying out the full intent and purpose of these
provisions to subject any nonexempt assets of any judgment debtor
to the satisfaction of any judgment against the judgment debtor.” 47

40. Id. (citing Equity Trust Co. Custodian ex rel. Eisenmenger IRA v. Cole, 766
N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)).
41. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wartman, 841 N.W.2d 637, 643 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014),
review denied (Mar. 18, 2014) (finding a judgment creditor’s attempt to pierce
corporate veil of third party in satisfaction of a prior judgment to constitute an
enforcement action on the judgment, rather than an independent cause of action).
42. Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *4; MINN. STAT. § 322B.833, subdiv. 1(3)(i).
43. See, e.g., Clarinda Color LLC v. BW Acq. Corp., No. 00-CV-722 JMR/FLN,
2004 WL 2862298, at *9 (D. Minn. June 14, 2004) (“We conclude that the Court does
have subject matter jurisdiction over Clarinda’s claims to the extent that Clarinda is
seeking to avoid fraudulent transfers and to enforce the underlying judgment. Under
the Minnesota UFTA, the remedies are limited to: avoidance of the transfer,
attachment, an injunction, execution, or appointment of a receiver to take charge of
the transferred asset. See Minn .Stat. § 513.47.”).
44. See MINN. STAT. § 322B.833, subdiv. 1(3)(i).
45. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.6101–.6143. (2015); MICH. CT. R. 2.621 (2015).
46. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6104(2).
47. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6104(5).
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In spite of these seemingly broad provisions, however, Michigan
courts have refused to permit a judgment creditor to pierce the
corporate veil of a third party, particularly if no fraudulent transfer
is alleged to have been made.48
In contrast to veil-piercing actions, sections 600.6116 and
600.6134 of the Michigan Compiled Laws do permit the avoidance
of fraudulent transfers to third parties by the judgment debtor,
considering them to be the property of the judgment debtor subject
to enforcement.49 As such, while Michigan courts may be willing to
permit fraudulent transfer avoidance claims in supplemental
proceedings, they will not go as far as other courts in allowing veilpiercing claims.
2. Illinois
Under Illinois law, supplemental proceedings are governed by
chapter 735, section 5/2-1402 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes and
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277.50 Fraudulent transfer avoidance
can be accomplished directly in supplemental proceedings, without
the need to initiate an entirely new proceeding.51 Veil piercing,
however, has been consistently disallowed by Illinois courts in the
context of supplemental proceedings, with judgment creditors being
forced to initiate entirely new causes of actions to further pursue
their enforcement efforts.52
In 2008, however, the Illinois legislature enacted certain
amendments to chapter 735, section 5/2-1402,53 which led to
speculation that at least some veil-piercing claims could perhaps be
48. See Green, 767 N.W.2d 660, 665–68 (holding that judgment creditor could not
pierce the corporate veil of a third party to whom no fraudulent transfer was alleged
to have been made); see also Int’l Millennium Consultants, Inc. v. Taycom Bus
Solutions, Inc., No. 08-CV-11303, 2010 WL 1347597 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2010).
49. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.6116, .6134 (2015); see also Woodridge Hills Ass’n,
2011 WL 6378813, at *3.
50. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-1402 (2014); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 277 (2013).
51. See, e.g., Star Ins. Co., 561 F.3d at 660 (interpreting Illinois law to allow for
the impleading of fraudulent transferees directly in a supplemental proceeding);
Dexia Credit Loc. v. Rogan, 602 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 2010) (construing Illinois law
to permit the entry of a restraining order in supplemental proceeding which
prohibited third-party wife of judgment debtor from transferring assets).
52. See Pyshos, 630 N.E.2d at 1058 (forcing veil-piercing actions against third
parties to be pursued through a new action); Lange v. Misch, 598 N.E.2d 412, 415
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[N]othing in the [Illinois] Code authorizes the entry of a
judgment at a supplementary proceeding against a third party who does not possess
assets of the judgment debtor.”).
53. In particular, chapter 735, section 5/2-1402, subsection (c)(3) of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes was amended effective January 1, 2008, to include the following
provision: “A judgment creditor may recover a corporate judgment debtor’s property
on behalf of the judgment debtor for use of the judgment creditor by filing an
appropriate petition within the citation proceedings.” 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/21402(c)(3) (2014) (amended by S.B. 229, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., P.A. 95-661
(Ill. 2007)).
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brought directly within supplemental proceedings. 54 However, in
spite of these optimistic analyses, Illinois courts have refused to
date to interpret these 2008 amendments as permitting veil
piercing in supplemental proceedings, preferring to uphold the
validity and precedential weight of the existing caselaw which
predates the 2008 amendments.55
As a result, Illinois provides a unique example of a jurisdiction
whose legislature attempted to modernize and expand the scope of
its supplemental proceedings, but whose courts have failed to
effectively incorporate the enacted statutory modifications. This
conflict between the text of a statute, on the one hand, and its
interpretation, on the other, provides essential insight into how
statutes pertaining to supplemental proceedings must be carefully
crafted in order to ensure that the rights of judgment creditors are
consistently understood and enforced.
3. Connecticut
Sections 52-350a through 52-400f of the General Statutes of
Connecticut address postjudgment procedures. 56 In Connecticut,
fraudulent conveyance avoidance actions are considered simple
mechanisms, and are permissible remedies in supplemental
proceedings.57
However, this permission does not extend to veil-piercing
claims, which are restricted universally in Connecticut

54. For example, in Fish v. Hennessy, No. 12 C 1856, 2013 WL 5770512, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2013), the court observed in obiter dictum that the 2008
amendments to section 5/1402, subsection (c)(3) might theoretically permit a
judgment creditor to pierce the veil of a corporate judgment debtor in a supplemental
proceeding. However, the court held that no similar provision existed which would
permit a “reverse piercing” action (i.e., impleading a corporation to find it liable for
a judgment entered against an individual). See also JPMorgan Chase Bank v. PT
Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper, No. 02 C 6240, 2012 WL 2254193, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 14,
2012) (“No court has yet addressed the effect of the amendment on Star Insurance or
the cases on which it relied.”); Robert G. Markoff & Christopher J. McGeehan,
Enforcement of Judgments, in CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS § 2.54, at 48 (Robert
G. Markoff ed., 2009 & Supp. 2011) (opining that the 2008 amendment to section
5/1402, subsection (c)(3) “permits the court to hear a petition in the nature of an
action to pierce the corporate veil in the context of a citation proceeding rather than
forcing the creditor to file a new action as was required by Lange and Pyshos.”).
55. Buckley v. Abuzir, 2014 IL App. Ct. 130469, ¶ 9, N.E.3d 1166, 1169
(maintaining the existing rule under Lange and Pyshos that the “[p]arties may,
however, bring a separate action to pierce the corporate veil for a judgment already
obtained against a corporation.” (emphasis added)); see also Conserv FS, Inc. v. Von
Bergen Trucking, Inc., 2011 IL App. Ct. 101225U, ¶ 28 (“[W]e cannot reach the
merits of Conserv’s corporate-veil argument because an action to pierce the corporate
veil to hold RayVB [third-party corporation] liable for the judgment against VB [the
judgment debtor] is not properly brought, as it was here, in supplemental
proceedings to enforce the judgment against VB.”).
56. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-350a to -400f (2015).
57. See Epperson, 242 F.3d at 104.
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postjudgment practice.58 Connecticut law is exceptionally clear on
the distinction between veil-piercing claims and fraudulent transfer
avoidance actions, with only the latter made available for use by
judgment creditors in supplemental proceedings. 59 According to
Connecticut courts, this restriction is rooted in jurisdictional
concerns with imposing liability on third parties who were not
defendants to the underlying action.60 Thus, Connecticut’s
supplemental proceedings are limited in scope, and do not have the
same degree of flexibility as those jurisdictions which permit claims
that establish liability on the part of a new party. 61
4. Alaska
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 69 is the controlling authority
for supplemental proceedings in the state of Alaska. 62 However, its
provisions are meager, with only a limited number of available
remedies for judgment creditors. 63 In particular, the text of Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 69(c) only allows the court to enter an order
preventing the disposition of property by the judgment debtor, but
does not explicitly provide for any remedy against a third-party
transferee in a supplemental proceeding for a fraudulent transfer
they received from the judgment debtor.64
Nevertheless, courts interpreting Alaska law have broadened
the scant language of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 69(c) to permit
actions sounding in fraudulent transfer avoidance when required to
enforce a judgment.65 Thus, although Alaska’s statutory provisions
58. See Connecticut Sav. Bank v. Obenauf, 758 A.2d 363, 365 (Conn. App. Ct.
2000) (“Accordingly, under Connecticut law . . . a successful claim of fraudulent
conveyance could not result in a judgment of liability against the transferee, joint
and several or otherwise, on the underlying debt obligations owed by the
transferor.”); Crepeau v. Gronager, 675 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996);
Derderian v. Derderian, 490 A.2d 1008, 1013 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
59. Epperson, 242 F.3d at 104; Bridgeport Water Pollution Control Auth. v. Prof.
Servs. Grp., No. 399294, 2004 WL 1925833, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004).
60. Schuftan v. Bridges, No. 3:06CV00741 SRU, 2007 WL 2688856, at *2 (D.
Conn. Sept. 13, 2007).
61. Epperson, 242 F.3d at 107 (“Nothing in Connecticut statutory or common law
would permit a party to impose liability for the underlying judgment on the
transferee of a fraudulent conveyance or to reach the transferee’s own assets.”).
62. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 69.
63. Id.
64. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 69(c) (“[T]he court may make an order restraining the
judgment debtor from selling, transferring, or in any manner disposing of any
property liable to execution pending the proceeding. For disobeying any order or
requirement authorized by this rule the judgment debtor may be punished as for a
contempt.”).
65. See Buster, 95 F.3d at 1452 (“Although Alaska R. Civ. P. 69 does not expressly
authorize postjudgment fraudulent conveyance actions . . . [s]ince Federal Rule 69(a)
is . . . not meant to put the judge into a procedural straitjacket . . . we think [t]he
procedure followed here . . . accord[ed] with the spirit of the Rules and . . . [was] a
sufficiently close adherence to state procedures.”) (alterations in original) (citations

290

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:279

pertaining to supplemental proceedings are relatively narrow when
read literally, courts have been willing to stretch their
interpretations of the applicable rules when the “exigencies of the
case or the interests of justice may [so] require.”66
The permissibility of veil-piercing claims in supplemental
proceedings is a scarcely litigated topic in published Alaska
opinions. That being said, at least one fairly recent trial court
decision found that extending alter ego liability was inappropriate
in the context of postjudgment litigation. 67 Given this absence of
favorable rulings, there is currently no indication that Alaskan
courts are willing to interpret Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 69(c)
to permit veil-piercing actions in supplemental proceedings.

C. Group 3—Jurisdictions with Supplemental
Proceedings That Prohibit Both Piercing and
Fraudulent Transfer Avoidance
1. Georgia
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 9-11-69
provides a limited number of remedies to judgment creditors in aid
of the execution of judgment.68 These include examining persons
who may have knowledge of the location of the judgment debtor’s
assets,69 but certainly do not extend to piercing the corporate veil. 70
Notably, the statute does not even permit the avoidance of a
fraudulent transfer without the filing of a new complaint. 71
However, at least one Georgia district court has permitted the
initiation of a new, but related action in order to accomplish transfer
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Great W. Sav. Bank v. George
W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 581 n.12 (Alaska 1989) (“A court of equity has power to
entertain an action which has for its purpose the enforcement of a judgment in order
that complete justice may be done to the parties in interest as the exigencies of the
case or the interests of justice may require.”) (quoting Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S.
253, 262 (1855)).
66. Buster, 95 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Great W. Sav. Bank, 778 P.2d at 581 n.4).
67. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C., No. 3AN-13-07180CI, 2015 WL
7184610, at *1 (Alaska Super. July 10, 2015) (rejecting arguments raised by
judgment creditor suggesting that it had the right to present postjudgment “alter ego
evidence” to find a third-party law firm liable for the debt of the judgment debtor);
see also Leisnoi, Inc.’s Trial Brief at 6, Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C. (Alaska
Super.) (No. 3AN-13-07180CI), 2014 WL 10725649.
68. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-69 (2015) (LexisNexis).
69. Id.
70. C-Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 S.E.2d 383, 385 (Ga. 2002) (“To
enforce a judgment against persons who are not parties to a judgment, a judgmentcreditor in Georgia must initiate a civil action against those it seeks to hold
responsible . . . which requires a complaint to be filed and the defendants to be served
with process.”) (footnote omitted).
71. Reyes-Fuentes, 2012 WL 3562399, at *6; see also supra text accompanying
note 24.
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avoidance.72 Thus, although Georgia state law provides for
exceptionally narrow supplemental proceedings in which even
fraudulent transfers cannot be avoided, courts have been willing to
ease this rigidity by facilitating the initiation of new lawsuits by
judgment creditors.
2. New York
The state of New York has a unique statutory enforcement
mechanism, known as a special proceeding, which is governed by
article 52 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 73 Under
section 5225(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, a
judgment creditor pursuing property in the possession of the
judgment debtor must seek a court order requiring the judgment
debtor to turn it over.74 But, under section 5225(b), a judgment
creditor pursuing property in the possession of someone other than
the judgment debtor must “commence an [entirely new] action”
against the person in possession. 75
Thus, while New York’s special proceeding may seem to be
flexible at first, this unique statutory creation still requires an
entirely new case be initiated in order to establish third-party
liability for fraudulent transfers.
However, the special proceeding also has its appurtenant
advantages in comparison to an ordinary lawsuit:
With regard to the special proceeding provided for in CPLR 5225(b),
it is well established that it may be used to attack fraudulent
transfers without the need to resort to a plenary action. The main
attainment here, since the same kind of relief has always been
available in a plenary action, is that the facile device of a special
proceeding is being made available to do the job, avoiding the usual
delays of the conventional action.76

In fact, the special proceeding can even be used to pierce a corporate
veil,77 and even compel foreign banks to turnover assets to pay the
debts of account-bearers who are New York account judgment
debtors.78
As a result, while New York is unusually rigid in its
requirement that a judgment creditor initiate new actions to avoid
fraudulent transfer, its special proceedings are enormously flexible
72. Id.
73. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5201–5253 (2015).
74. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225(a).
75. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225(b); Wasserman Media Grp., 2012 WL 1506181, at *2–3.
76. Mitchell v. Lyons Prof’l Servs., Inc. 727 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(quoting David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225:7, at 264–65
(McKinney 1997)).
77. WBP Cent. Assocs. v. DeCola, 855 N.Y.S.2d 210, 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
78. See Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 2009) (compelling
a third-party Bermudan bank to turnover stock certificates in a garnishment
proceeding against New York judgment debtor).
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once opened, affording plenary relief. In this respect, New York is
similar to the jurisdictions in Group 1. The following Analysis
Section of this comment will delve deeper into these similarities as
well as the distinctions among the surveyed jurisdictions in Group
1, Group 2, and Group 3. In particular, the next Section will focus
on the influence that each jurisdiction’s supplemental proceedings
have on judicial economy and the successful enforcement of
judgments.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction to Analysis
“Judicial economy is concerned with the best allocation among
competing claimants of [judicial] resources which have not been
used.”79 A critical auxiliary goal to every court, judicial economy is
an essential factor which weighs heavily in procedural policies and
decisions.80 For example, one efficient and universally implemented
method to preserve judicial resources is to assign a particular judge
to a particular case. By ensuring that one judge sees the case
through its inception through its disposition, a court promotes
judicial familiarity, which saves time and achieves fairer results. 81
The striking differences highlighted in this comment between
each jurisdiction’s supplemental proceedings also have disparate
impacts on judicial economy. Likewise, the distinctions between
these jurisdictions bear a very close connection with a judgment
creditor’s likelihood of collecting on its judgment. Multiple
jurisdictions have even tackled perceived due process concerns with

79. Don B. Kates & William T. Baker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward
a Coherent Theory, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1385, 1433–34 (1974).
80. See, e.g., Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding
that a district court must consider “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity” when determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction); Aioi Seiki,
Inc. v. JIT Automation, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 950 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (“[P]laintiff gives
no evidence or argument that would suggest that . . . judicial economy would be better
served if this court allowed this action to continue as a new proceeding separate from
the original judgment.”); see also Alvarez, 465 F.2d at 374 (finding that judicial
economy favors using the same judge to adjudicate disputes between prior litigants).
But see Peacock, 516 U.S. at 355 (“[N]either the convenience of litigants nor
consideration of judicial economy” can justify the extension of ancillary jurisdiction
over Thomas’ [i.e., the judgment creditor’s] claims in this subsequent proceeding.”)
(quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978)).
81. See, e.g., Drake v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 323 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Given the lengthy history of Drake’s litigations, and the Court’s
familiarity with every aspect of his lawsuits, judicial economy, convenience and
fairness—notwithstanding basic concerns for comity—would be served by keeping
the case with the Court.”); U.S. Ship Mgmt. v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 357 F. Supp. 2d
924, 939 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“[T]he more important consideration is judicial economy in
having the same judge consider the same underlying facts and issues only once and
thereby guarding against inconsistent results.”); Alvarez, 465 F.2d at 374.
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permitting veil piercing in supplemental proceedings.82 This
analysis seeks to review the jurisdictions of Group 1, Group 2, and
Group 3 in order to identify how the differences in their
supplemental proceedings impact these particular issues.

B. The Effect of Group 1’s Laws on Judicial Economy,
Ease of Enforcement, and Due Process
(Florida and Minnesota)
Florida and Minnesota’s supplemental proceedings are
flexible, with their courts allowing both veil piercing and fraudulent
conveyance claims to be directly brought without any need to file a
new action.83 This flexibility promotes judicial economy to a great
degree by reducing the total number of cases on the docket, and by
ensuring that judges will hear matters that are essentially related
to the judgments they previously entered. As a result, judges can
reduce the amount of time they need to familiarize themselves with
new fact patterns and litigants.
Moreover, judgments are easier to enforce in Florida and
Minnesota because judgment creditors do not need to initiate
entirely new causes of action to implead third parties in order to
pierce a shell corporation’s veil or to avoid a fraudulent transfer. 84
As such, additional filing fees are saved and the amount of time and
resources expended on discovery can be severely reduced. This is
because there is no need to expend additional court costs associated
with filing a new civil action,85 and the discovery process is far less
expansive in supplemental proceedings.86
However, this supplemental jurisdiction is not without its
limits. For example, in Geigo Props., L.L.P., the court refused to
pierce a corporate debtor’s veil to attach liability to its individual

82. For example, the Supreme Court in Peacock, 516 U.S. 349, explicitly held that
due process concerns precluded the possibility of impleading third parties to federal
enforcement proceedings for the purpose of attaching liability to them for the
underlying judgment. Nevertheless, this decision did not preclude state law and
state courts providing remedies in excess of what is permissible under federal
enforcement jurisdiction. See, e.g., Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *4–6; Sanchez,
127 So. 3d at 628–29; Ocala, 735 So. 2d at 543.
83. See generally Sanchez, 127 So. 3d 627; Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851.
84. Id.
85. In Florida, filing fees range from $395 to $1,900, depending on the size of the
claim. FLA. STAT. § 28.241 (2013). Thus, in Florida, avoiding the filing of a new action
can be highly desirable, especially if the claim in question is large. In contrast,
Minnesota’s filing fees are a flat $310, regardless of the size of the claim. MINN. STAT.
§ 357.022, subdiv. 2(1). Regardless of the amount of the savings, judgment creditors
in both Florida and Minnesota benefit by avoiding the unnecessary costs associated
with filing an entirely new action.
86. The issues raised in supplemental proceedings are narrower in their scope,
as they almost exclusively relate to the assets of the judgment debtor, and the
potential transfer or exchange of those assets to third parties.
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president merely because the president had used a shell
corporation, citing a lack of improper conduct.87 In contrast, in cases
where a shareholder creates a sham corporation for the purpose of
misleading creditors, both Florida and Minnesota have allowed
liability to attach to that shareholder without the need for an
entirely new proceeding.88 The point of distinction is whether the
judgment debtor is in fact a mere alter ego of a controlling third
party, with Florida and Minnesota courts permitting this question
to be adjudicated directly in supplemental proceedings. 89
Although this expansion of enforcement jurisdiction has been
attacked by litigants citing due process concerns, Florida and
Minnesota courts have consistently upheld the broad scope of their
supplemental proceedings.90 Specifically, Group 1 courts have
reasoned that even in instances of veil piercing, the court is merely
acting to enforce an existing judgment against an alter ego of the
judgment debtor,91 and that this alter ego relationship is the basis
for the extension of liability. 92 Thus, the flexible supplemental
proceedings of jurisdictions in Group 1 may not necessarily lead to
due process concerns, provided that courts are careful and apply
strict standards when deciding to extend liability to an alter ego. 93
Ultimately, Group 1’s flexibility is a boon to judicial economy
and judgment enforcement, as it reduces the number of cases that
need to be assigned to new judges, while simultaneously facilitating
judgment enforcement for creditors. These benefits are supported
by exacting requirements for applying third-party liability. As such,
Group 1 jurisdictions provides key models for understanding how
enforcement proceedings have been, and continue to evolve
throughout the country.

87. Geigo Props., L.L.P., 849 So. 2d at 1109.
88. Ocala, 735 So. 2d at 542–43; Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29; Guava LLC, 2015
WL 4877851, at *4–6.
89. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 841 N.W.2d at 642; Ocala, 735 So. 2d at 542–43;
Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29.
90. Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29; Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *4–6.
91. See Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 841 N.W.2d at 643 (“[T]he district court correctly
concluded that appellant’s veil-piercing action is similar to a creditor’s bill, is
ancillary to the original 2002 judgment, and is intended only to satisfy an existing
judgment.”).
92. See Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *5–6 (finding veil piercing to require
the establishment of an alter ego relationship).
93. For example, in Florida, these exacting standards for veil piercing include
requirements that the judgment debtor be a “mere instrumentality” of the third
party, and that the third party act with the fraudulent intent to mislead creditors.
Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29. See also Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *6–8
(detailing a two-prong test to establish an alter ego relationship, considering a
multitude of factors).
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C. The Effect of Group 2’s Laws on Judicial Economy,
Ease of Enforcement, and Due Process (Michigan,
Illinois, Connecticut, and Alaska)
States in Group 2 have realized some of the benefits of
expanding enforcement jurisdiction, primarily by permitting
fraudulent transfer avoidance actions to be consolidated with
supplemental proceedings.94 However, by disallowing veil-piercing
claims from supplemental proceedings, it is still possible for some
judgment debtors to prolong enforcement by funneling assets
through alter egos, while judgment creditors are forced to expend
additional costs in pursuing new actions. 95
In contrast to fraudulent transfer avoidance actions, the
jurisdictions in Group 2 have approached veil piercing with
hesitation. In Connecticut, for example, traditional common law
principles of liability and due process have lead courts to disfavor
veil piercing in supplemental proceedings. 96 An even more
intriguing situation is Illinois, where a statutory amendment lead
some to speculate that at least some veil-piercing actions could be
brought in a supplemental proceeding.97 Nevertheless, Illinois
courts have seemingly refused to acknowledge any effect to this
amendment, and have continued to cite old precedent which
precludes any possibility of veil piercing in a supplemental
proceeding.98
The state of Michigan also has repeatedly analyzed the
question of whether a third party can ever be found liable in a
supplemental proceeding for the underlying judgment of the
94. E.g., Star Ins. Co., 561 F.3d at 660 (interpreting Illinois law to allow for the
impleading of fraudulent transferees in a supplemental proceeding); Buster, 95 F.3d
at 1459–60 (finding Alaska law to permit judgment debtors to directly implead thirdparty transferees of fraudulent conveyances into supplemental proceedings, even if
transferees are not parties to the underlying action); Woodridge Hills Ass’n, 2011 WL
6378813, at *3 (determining that Michigan law permits impleading of third parties
into supplemental proceeding for purposes of fraudulent transfer avoidance).
95. The Illinois case of Conserv FS, Inc., 2011 IL App. Ct. 101225U, provides a
particularly potent example, with the appellate court refusing to reach the merits of
the appellant’s veil-piercing arguments due to the improper venue of supplemental
proceedings. One can only imagine the wasted costs associated with refiling an
entirely new action to have these claims heard, only to have the adjudications in that
new action subject to appeal once again. See supra text accompanying note 55.
96. Derderian, 3 Conn. App. at 529 (“Common law principles do not authorize a
general creditor to pursue the transferee in a fraudulent conveyance action for
anything other than the specific property transferred or the proceeds thereof.”).
97. See Fish, 2013 WL 5770512, at *1; JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2012 WL 2254193,
at *3; Robert G. Markoff & Christopher J. McGeehan, Enforcement of Judgments, in
CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS § 2.54, at 48; see also supra text accompanying note
54.
98. See, e.g., Buckley, 2014 IL App. Ct. 130469, ¶ 9 (following traditional Illinois
precedent requiring filing of separate action to pierce corporate veil); Conserv FS,
Inc., 2011 IL App. Ct. 101225U, ¶ 28.
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judgment debtor.99 But, like other Group 2 states, Michigan courts
have drawn upon the same common law traditions and precedential
decisions, and as a result, have been unwilling to extend liability in
this way.100 The adherence of jurisdictions in Group 2 such as
Connecticut, Illinois, and Michigan to older precedent rooted in
common law is understandable, especially in light of the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Peacock v. Thomas.101 Although this
viewpoint may be familiar for courts, it does not consider the
unnecessary delays imposed in requiring new civil actions to
remedy instances of fraudulent conduct by a judgment debtor, 102
such as those involving shell corporations. 103
Nevertheless, by at least allowing for fraudulent conveyance
litigation in supplemental proceedings, Group 2 states still benefit
judicial economy more so than if these actions had to be separately
litigated through filing new actions. In addition, by allowing
creditors to directly avoid fraudulent transfers in supplemental
proceedings, Group 2 jurisdictions facilitate judgment enforcement
by giving creditors extra statutory teeth to use in enforcing their
judgments.104 But, these remedies are not nearly as potent as those
99. See, e.g., Green, 767 N.W.2d 660 (finding that the filing of a new action is
required to attach liability to a third-party corporation); Int’l Millennium
Consultants, Inc., 2010 WL 1347597; Aioi Seiki, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 950; Dundee
Cement Co. v. Schupbach Bros., 288 N.W.2d 379 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Kostopoulos
v. Crimmins, No. 299478, 2011 WL 6848354 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2011).
100. Green, 767 N.W.2d 660; Int’l Millennium Consultants, Inc., 2010 WL
1347597.
101. 516 U.S. 349, 357 (precluding federal enforcement jurisdiction from
attaching liability to third parties); see also H.C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S. 497
(1910) (refusing to force individual directors of a judgment debtor corporation to be
liable for the judgment already obtained against the corporation).
102. For just one of the countless examples of just how long the enforcement
process can take if new actions are required to be filed, see Mack Film Dev., LLC v.
Benv. Partners, No. FBTCV104033543S, 2014 WL 6462116, at *4 (Conn. Super. Oct.
10, 2014) (“In the present case, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant has delayed
various enforcement proceedings since 2008, including refusing to appear at an
examination of judgment debtor in April 2011, leading to the defendant’s arrest on
March 26, 2013, the precursor to the recently completed examination of judgment
debtor . . . .”).
103. For example, in Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue, 233 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2000),
the First Circuit affirmed a district court decision to pierce the corporate veil of an
underfunded corporation owned by a judgment debtor’s wife, which had been used
for the purpose of funneling assets away from potential enforcement. Notably, the
underlying judgment from which the judgment debtor sought to protect his assets
was entered in February 1995, and the judgment creditor filed a subsequent lawsuit
in November 1995 seeking to pierce the corporate veil of the judgment debtor’s
related entity. Id. But, it was not until November 28, 2000, that the appeal of this
subsequent lawsuit was finally decided. Id. at 38. Thus, the requirement that a
judgment creditor file an entirely new action to collect upon a judgment resulted in
over five years of delayed enforcement in this particular case, in no small part due to
the ability of the judgment debtor’s continued ability to relitigate and even appeal
every milestone event of the subsequent action from service through judgment.
104. See, e.g., C. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. AEH Constr., Inc., No. 14-3052, 2015
WL 5462139, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2015) (“As noted above, a judgment creditor
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in Florida and Minnesota, where veil piercing is also permissible in
supplemental proceedings, and the courts have even wider latitude
over whether to hold a third party liable. As a result, Group 2
jurisdictions have common, but increasingly outdated limitations on
the remedies permissible in supplemental proceedings.

D. The Effect of Group 3’s Laws on Judicial Economy,
Ease of Enforcement, and Due Process
(New York and Georgia)
States in this final group are among the least flexible with
respect to supplemental proceedings. While New York does have a
unique statutory creation called the special proceeding which seems
to permit both fraudulent transfer avoidance and veil piercing, this
special proceeding still requires the filing of a new action with
certain appurtenant costs.105 Georgia law is even less flexible, with
few statutory carve-outs for judgment creditors.106 Federal courts
interpreting Georgia law have been forced to stretch the applicable
statutes just to permit the avoidance of fraudulent conveyances
through a newly filed, though still ancillary, proceeding.107
The two states in Group 3 are both inefficient from the
perspective of judicial economy and in terms of reducing court costs,
as they necessitate additional docket entries 108 and filing fees.109
Nevertheless, New York’s special proceedings at least provide
judgment creditors with the capacity to recover from third parties
once these requirements have been met, even to the extent of
requiring foreign banks to surrender assets. 110 To this end, if one is
attempting to pursue a foreign bailee or agent holding the assets of
may obtain ‘avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy
the creditor’s claim,’ and, where a judgment creditor has obtained judgment against
a debtor, ‘the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset
transferred.’”) (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 160/8(a)(1), (b) (2014)); accord
Woodridge Hills Ass’n, 2011 WL 6378813, at *3 (construing MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 600.6116, .6134).
105. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225(b) (requiring a new “special proceeding [be]
commenced by the judgment creditor,” the cost of which “shall not be awarded
against a person who did not dispute the judgment debtor’s interest or right to
possession.”); Wasserman Media Grp., 2012 WL 1506181, at *2–3 (finding that the
impleading of a third party requires the initiation of new proceeding, not mere filing
of motion); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 8018(a)(1),(3), 8020(a) (2015) (detailing fees
associated with filing new proceedings).
106. See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-69 (2015) (LexisNexis) (setting forth the
limited available remedies for judgment creditors); C-Staff, Inc., 571 S.E.2d at 385
(prohibiting veil piercing in supplemental proceedings).
107. Reyes-Fuentes, 2012 WL 3562399, at *6.
108. Id.
109. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 8018(a)(1),(3), 8020(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-6-77(e)(2)
(2010).
110. See Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 825 (extending jurisdiction over third-party
Bermudan Bank holding stock certificates owned by judgment debtor).
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a judgment debtor, New York’s special proceedings may be the most
creditor-friendly of all jurisdictions. 111 In contrast, Georgia’s law
pertaining to supplemental proceedings is vague and toothless, and
has a negative impact on both judicial economy and judgment
enforcement.112 As a result, while both Group 3 jurisdictions require
judgment creditors initiate new causes of action (and pay filing fees)
to avoid fraudulent transfers, New York’s and Georgia’s
supplemental proceedings have little else in common.
In fact, the most striking differences between New York’s
special proceedings and Georgia’s supplemental proceedings are the
explicit statutory provisions in New York which allow for avoidance
of fraudulent transfers and the surrender of property owned by the
judgment debtor.113 Through these provisions, New York’s special
proceedings certainly provide stronger enforcement rights than
those afforded Georgia law.114 However, these very same provisions
have also evoked due process concerns, especially when they have
been utilized against foreign corporations. 115 As a result, New
111. “The Court of Appeals is generally creditor-friendly when it comes to
localizing the situs of property or garnishees in New York.” Vincent C. Alexander,
The CPLR at Fifty: A View from Academia, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 664,
679 (2013) (citing Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 926 N.E.2d 1202 (N.Y. 2010);
Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 825; ABKCO Indus. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y.
1976)).
112. The very fact that the case of Reyes-Fuentes, 2012 WL 3562399, had to be
decided largely on the basis of federal enforcement jurisdiction, and not state law,
which is the typical basis of enforcement procedure under F.R.C.P. 69, is proof
positive that Georgia state law pertaining to supplemental proceedings is
considerably weaker than desirable for enforcement purposes.
113. The most notable of these provisions reads in pertinent part as follows:
Upon a special proceeding commenced by the judgment creditor, against a
person in possession or custody of money or other personal property in which
the judgment debtor has an interest, or against a person who is a transferee
of money or other personal property from the judgment debtor, where it is
shown that the judgment debtor is entitled to the possession of such property
or that the judgment creditor’s rights to the property are superior to those of
the transferee, the court shall require such person to pay the money, or so
much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, to the judgment creditor
and, if the amount to be so paid is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, to
deliver any other personal property, or so much of it as is of sufficient value to
satisfy the judgment, to a designated sheriff.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225(b).
114. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5225, with Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-69.
115. The majority’s decision in Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 825–31, provoked
numerous negative opinions, the first being Judge Smith’s dissent, to which two
other judges subscribed. Koehler, 911 N.E.2d 825 at 831–34 (J. Smith, dissenting).
Other jurisdictions later agreed with this dissent, refusing to follow the majority’s
decision that would permit the extension of enforcement jurisdiction beyond the
territory of the United States. See, e.g., Sargeant v. Al-Saleh, 137 So. 3d 432, 435
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), reh’g denied (May 5, 2014), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1040
(Fla. 2014) (“From a policy standpoint, we agree with the Koehler dissent.”); Alfred
J. Lechner, Jr., After Koehler, New York Courts Joust with Federal Courts over
Separate Entity Rule, 9 No. 5. Sec. Litig. Rep. 8 (2012) (“The 4–3 Koehler majority
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York’s unique special proceedings illustrate some of the potential
benefits and risks that correspond with expanding enforcement
jurisdiction, while still imposing some of the burdensome costs
associated with the filing of a new action. Georgia’s supplemental
proceedings, on the other hand, only illustrate the negative effect
that vague and unsatisfactory statutory provisions can have on
judgment enforcement.

E. The Juxtaposition of Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3
It is clear that each of the supplemental proceedings
represented in Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3 have their respective
benefits and concerns.116 Through this analysis, the benefits and
concerns of each jurisdiction has been identified, and can now be
used as the basis of comparison among the jurisdictions.
Understanding the advantages of each jurisdiction’s supplemental
proceeding, as well as potential criticisms, is an essential step to
developing a practical model for the future.
Initially, the thrust of the concerns in jurisdictions which
prohibit veil piercing in supplemental proceedings pertain to due
process, and particularly, the extent to which a court can properly
find a third party liable for the judgment of another. 117 Jurisdictions
in Group 2, as well as Georgia in Group 3, for example, find no basis
in the common law to allow a third party to be found liable for a
judgment entered against another. 118 In contrast, Group 1
jurisdictions have not found any unsurmountable due process issues
with extending the scope of supplemental proceedings, especially in
light of the fact that the third party is entitled to a hearing in which
it can assert its defenses.119

opinion should not be extended.”).
116. For example, supplemental proceedings in Florida have the benefit of
allowing judgment creditors to directly implead third parties, but with this benefit
comes the appurtenant risk of alienating litigants’ due process rights. See Sanchez,
127 So. 3d at 628–629 (allowing veil piercing in supplemental proceedings under
Florida law); but cf. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354–55 (expressing concerns with
expanding ancillary judgment over third parties in federal enforcement proceedings).
117. For example, the following statement by the Supreme Court is a common
basis for many jurisdictions’ reluctance to expand enforcement jurisdiction: “We have
never authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to
impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already
liable for that judgment.” Peacock, 516 U.S. at 357. However, despite this holding,
there is no similar prohibition on transferring liability on state court judgments.
118. See, e.g., Epperson, 242 F.3d at 107 (finding no basis under common law or
Connecticut law to assign liability for a judgment to another); Green, 767 N.W.2d at
667–68 (holding that Michigan law requires the filing of new action in order to find
liability of third-party corporation); Pyshos, 630 N.E.2d at 1058 (finding Illinois law
requires the filing of a new action in order to find liability against a third party); CStaff, Inc., 571 S.E.2d 383 (interpreting Georgia law to preclude any possibility of
veil piercing in supplemental proceedings).
119. See, e.g., Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *5 (noting that any procedural
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Nevertheless, Group 1 jurisdictions still have limits in place
which attempt to assuage any due process concerns associated with
veil piercing in supplemental proceedings. For example, in Florida,
these limits include a showing that that the third-party corporation
sought to be pierced was created for a fraudulent purpose or to
misleading creditors.120 By putting in place these kinds of
limitations, jurisdictions have limited the extension of liability in
supplemental proceedings to only those entities who are used to
further fraudulent plans, or who are mere instrumentalities121 for
the purpose of frustrating collection efforts.
Ultimately,
these
differences
between
jurisdictions’
supplemental proceedings have a significant impact on judgment
creditors’ ability to successfully collect, as well as the judicial
economy of each jurisdiction’s docket. Although extending the scope
of potential liability in supplemental proceedings to include third
parties raises some due process concerns, these issues can be moreor-less disposed of with appropriate safeguards. The determination
and implementation of these safeguards is a key subject in the
proposal outlined in the following section of this comment.

IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Preferred Means of Expanding Enforcement
Jurisdiction—Legislative Amendment
or Judicial Interpretation?
Upon consideration of the distinctions in the supplemental
proceedings of the jurisdictions in Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3,
due process concerns were negated because the third-party defendant had been
“afforded a full opportunity to present a defense to his personal liability.”); see also
Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29; Ocala, 735 So. 2d at 543.
120. See Rashdan, 706 So. 2d at 357–58 (“The corporate veil cannot be pierced
absent a showing of improper conduct, or that the corporation was organized or
employed for some fraudulent purpose or to mislead creditors.”) (citing Dania Jai–
Alai Palace, Inc., 450 So. 2d 1114; Moorings at Aberdeen Homeowners Ass’n v. UDC
Homes, Inc., 673 So. 2d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Acquisition Corp. of Am. v.
Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 543 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Steinhardt v.
Banks, 511 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
121. Numerous jurisdictions have employed this “mere instrumentality”
language to describe the conditions in which veil piercing is permissible. See, e.g.,
Woodridge Hills Ass’n, 2011 WL 6378813, at *6 (“For the corporate veil to be pierced,
the corporate entity must be a mere instrumentality of another individual or
entity.”); Equity Trust Co. Custodian ex rel. Eisenmenger IRA v. Cole, 766 N.W.2d
334, 339 (Minn. App. 2009) (If the corporation or limited liability company is found
to be an alter ego or mere instrumentality, a court may pierce the corporate veil if
there is an “element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.”); Schuftan, 2007 WL
2688856, at *1 (“Under Connecticut law, courts will disregard the fiction of separate
legal entity when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or agent of another
corporation or individual owning all or most of its stock.”) (citations omitted) (quoting
another source) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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it is clear that there are potential ways to improve judicial economy
and successful judgment enforcement without unduly burdening
due process rights. One potential solution, drawing inspiration from
jurisdictions like Florida in Group 1, 122 and New York in Group 3,123
is to legislatively enact statutory mechanisms that allow creditors
to pierce the corporate veil and avoid fraudulent conveyances by
debtors in supplemental proceedings. Another avenue to accomplish
these goals is to enlarge a court’s enforcement jurisdiction through
judicial decisions that broadly interpret the provisions of an existing
statute, a possibility that is perhaps best exemplified by Minnesota
in Group 2.124
Both of these possible methods of expanding enforcement
jurisdiction and increasing the likelihood of successful judgment
collection have their potential pitfalls. For example, even if a
legislature successfully enacts an amendment which purports to
expand the scope of supplemental proceedings, that is still no
guarantee that courts will interpret and judicially enforce the
change. This is especially evident in the example of Illinois, a Group
2 jurisdiction who enacted statutory amendments in 2008 125 that
some commentators thought would permit judgment debtors to take
control of third-party corporate assets directly in supplemental
proceedings.126 Despite these amendments, Illinois courts have
refused to date to acknowledge any realistic impact of the
amendments, and have continued to follow pre-amendment
precedent which requires entirely new actions to be initiated in
order to enforce judgments against third parties.127
In contrast, if enforcement jurisdiction is expanded through
broad judicial interpretations of existing statutes (instead of
legislative amendments), the danger is that there will be no
concrete foundation upon which to decide whether a certain
particular procedure or situation falls under the court’s enforcement
jurisdiction. In other words, relying solely upon judicial decisions to
expand enforcement jurisdiction may not achieve the precise
procedural clarity necessary to ensure due process in supplemental
proceedings. For example, crucial due process issues such as the

122. FLA. STAT. § 56.29; Sanchez, 127 So. 3d at 628–29.
123. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5201–5253; WBP Cent. Assocs., 855 N.Y.S.2d 210.
124. See Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *4 (interpreting the broad phrase “the
court may grant any equitable relief it considers just and reasonable” contained in
section 322B.833, subdivision 1(3)(i) of the Minnesota Statutes to permit veil
piercing, which the court considered to be an equitable remedy).
125. S.B. 229, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., P.A. 95-661 (Ill. 2007) (amending,
inter alia, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-1402(c)(3)).
126. See Fish, 2013 WL 5770512, at *1; JPMorgan Chase Bank, 2012 WL
2254193, at *3; Robert G. Markoff & Christopher J. McGeehan, Enforcement of
Judgments, in CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS § 2.54, at 48; see also supra text
accompanying note 54.
127. Buckley, 2014 IL App. Ct. 130469, ¶ 9; Conserv FS, Inc., 2011 IL App. Ct.
101225U, ¶ 28.
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procedural right to respond to postjudgment discovery,128 or the
court’s capacity to adjudicate the substantive rights of the parties
to a supplemental proceeding,129 if not addressed by statute, will
have to be decided through further litigation and judicial opinions.
This very real possibility of creating additional legal questions that
must be answered from the bench could potentially negate any
advantage to judicial economy created by a judicial decision which
expands enforcement jurisdiction.
In light of these potential concerns, it seems that the most
prudent way for a given state to successfully expand enforcement
jurisdiction is to legislatively amend its relevant statutes pertaining
to supplemental proceedings in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
Through the process of statutory amendment, state legislatures can
negotiate and ensure that there are appropriate considerations for
creditors, debtors, and third-party defendants, as well as ensure
that the state courts will have adequate instructions to interpret
the new amendments.130 Thus, legislative amendment is a more
coherent method of expanding enforcement jurisdiction than solely
relying upon courts to broadly interpret existing statutes. The
considerations that should be weighed by legislatures attempting
such amendments, and some proposed putative mechanisms to
ensure that parties’ due process rights are preserved, will be
discussed in the following subsection.
128. Judgment creditors may “use supplementary proceedings to discover
whether the judgment debtor corporation’s individual shareholders and directors
held assets of the [debtor] corporation.” Miner v. Fashion Enters., 794 N.E.2d 902,
911 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). The procedural due process rights afforded by this
postjudgment discovery process are of particular importance to jurisdictions such as
Minnesota, which permit the extension of liability through supplemental
proceedings:
Hansmeier [the third-party owner] represented himself and Alpha [the
judgment debtor corporation] very actively throughout post-judgment
discovery, including filing an opposition to respondents’ request for an
examination of debtors and submitting multiple letters and motions to the
court on Alpha’s behalf. In granting the debtors’ examinations, the district
court found that Hansmeier had adequate notice and time to prepare for the
examinations. . . . . As the district court concluded, Hansmeier was afforded
due process and an adequate opportunity to present a defense.

Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *5.
129. Compare Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *4 (“Minn. Stat. § 322B.833,
subd. 1(3)(i) authorizes the district court to hear and determine whether to pierce
the corporate veil in post-judgment proceedings against an LLC.”), and Sanchez, 127
So. 3d at 629 (“[T]here is authority to support the use of proceedings supplementary
to pierce the corporate veil . . . .”), with Bollore S.A. v. Imp. Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d
317, 323 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is black-letter Texas law that proceedings pursuant to
the turnover statute may not be used to determine the substantive property rights
of the judgment debtors or of third parties.”), and Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 343–
45 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a district court may not use a turnover proceeding to
adjudicate whether a corporation is an individual judgment debtor’s alter ego).
130. In other words, unlike Illinois’s 2008 amendments which are essentially
ignored by its courts to this day.
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B. Expanding Enforcement Jurisdiction by Legislative
Amendment—Potential Implementation Considerations
and Methods to Protect Due Process Rights
Any legislative amendment to an issue as sensitive as
judgment enforcement and collections will have its fair share of
divisive opinions. On the one hand, expanding the scope of
supplemental proceedings to allow for veil piercing has the potential
to hold third parties liable for judgments they ordinarily would have
had the opportunity to defend through an entirely new lawsuit,
thereby infringing upon the distinction between a corporation and
its shareholders. However, expanding enforcement jurisdiction also
greatly assists judgment creditors in preventing judgment debtors
from conveying assets to shell corporations or to shareholders for
the purpose of obfuscating collection efforts. Thus, any legislative
amendment designed to affect the scope of supplemental
proceedings must be sensitive to both of these countervailing
concerns.
After taking in consideration the laws and judicial decisions of
the jurisdictions in Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3, the author
proposes that legislative amendments can be formulated which
create expansive supplemental proceedings like those of
jurisdictions in Group 1, but which nonetheless have explicit
safeguards in place to protect the due process rights of potential
litigants. For example, a state should pass an amendment which
resembles Florida’s proceedings supplementary or New York’s
special proceedings, but with explicit provisions that govern
postjudgment discovery, and stipulate the precise conditions in
which liability can properly implead and attach liability to a third
party.
Such an amendment could, for instance, have provisions which
allow a litigant to issue discovery to a third party on the subject of
that party’s relationship to the judgment debtor, with the third
party subject to impleading and even liability should it fail to
comply with the discovery requests. And, if the third party’s
discovery responses reveal evidence sufficient to establish a prima
facie showing that the third party is an alter ego or fraudulent agent
of the judgment debtor, the court in its discretion should be able to
implead the third party as a defendant, and require it to rebut any
formal veil-piercing or fraudulent transfer allegations brought
against it by the judgment creditor.
Presumably, such a putative amendment would also require
the original trial judge that entered the judgment to hear any
motions pertaining to postjudgment discovery or veil piercing, as
this judge is more likely to know the facts of the case and the
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litigants at issue.131 This hypothetical amendment could also
improve upon the jurisdictions in Group 2 and even the special
proceedings of New York in Group 3 by ensuring that a new case
does not need to be filed in order to continue
enforcement, thereby saving additional costs and unnecessary
docket clutter.132
Beyond just saving costs and docket entries, however,
loosening the requirement that a new action be filed to impose
liability on certain fraudulent third parties would be an enormous
boon to judicial economy, as there would be no need to have a
completely new discovery and prejudgment process begin anew.
Rather, all that is really necessary in such cases is a narrowly
tailored postjudgment discovery and fact-finding process focused on
the relationship between a given third party and the judgment
debtor.133 Such an amendment could prevent the filing of entirely
131. See U.S. Ship Mgmt., 357 F. Supp. 2d at 939 (pointing out judicial economy
is best served by having the same judge consider the facts and arguments raised only
once).
132. For examples of these costs, See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 8018(a)(1),(3), 8020(a); see
also Wasserman Media Grp., 2012 WL 1506181, at *2–3.
133. In fact, it is even possible to imagine a state implementing a template or
form which incorporates some of the typical questions that might be asked to a third
party in which an alter ego or fraudulent agency relationship is suspected. For
example, in Illinois, in order for a citation lien to be considered valid against a
judgment debtor, the law already requires that the judgment creditor serve the
judgment debtor with a statutorily mandated form containing questions pertaining
to the income and assets of the judgment debtor. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b-1), (b-5)
(2014). There is no reason why similar forms could not be codified for both corporate
and individual third parties which lists questions pertaining to that party’s
relationship to the judgment debtor, and the party’s independent financial status.
These questions could even be largely based upon the jurisdiction’s standard factors
for the presence of an alter ego, such as the following listing, considered by one at
least one court to be “the most straightforward listing, employed in whole or part by
various jurisdictions”:
a) Does the parent own all or most of stock of the subsidiary?
b) Do the parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or
officers?
c) Does the parent corporation finance the subsidiary?
d) Did the parent corporation subscribe to all of the capital stock of the
subsidiary or otherwise cause its incorporation?
e) Does the subsidiary have grossly inadequate capital?
f) Does the parent pay the salaries and other expenses or losses of the
subsidiary?
g) Does the subsidiary do no business except with the parent or does the
subsidiary have no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent?
h) Is the subsidiary described by the parent (in papers or statements) as a
department or division of the parent or is the business or financial
responsibility of the subsidiary referred to as the parent corporation’s own?
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new causes of action solely intended to decide the limited issue of
whether a third party is an alter ego or fraudulent instrumentality
of a judgment debtor.
An amendment with these putative provisions could provide
judgment creditors with the necessary tools to enforce their
judgments against shell corporations, while still ensuring that
judgment debtors and their corporations have sufficient safeguards
to preserve their due process rights. Moreover, unlike jurisdictions
like Minnesota which rely largely upon judicial interpretations of
broadly written statutes to expand their supplemental
proceedings,134 codified amendments provide clarity and assurance
to both judgment creditors and debtors as to the extent of their
rights in enforcement proceedings. State legislatures can draft
provisions which explicitly address the permissible scope of
postjudgment discovery, and even create sections which set forth
the requirements for veil piercing, such as the evidentiary burden
required to establish the existence of an alter ego or fraudulent
purpose.
Thus, by enacting statutory amendments that allow judgment
creditors to veil pierce and avoid fraudulent transfers in
supplemental proceedings, subject to evidentiary showings and
judicial discretion, state legislatures can promote judicial economy
and successful collection efforts without unduly burdening the due
process rights of judgment debtors and third-party respondents.
Amendments of this kind will alleviate docket clutter by reducing
the number of new cases filed, and promote judicial economy by
ensuring that judges adjudicate cases in which they are already
familiar with the facts and litigants. Moreover, in the process of
debating and enacting such amendment, state legislatures have
free reign to decide exactly what kind of discovery should be
permissible,135 or whether to extend jurisdiction over foreign agents
and bailees of judgment debtors. 136 Ultimately, careful use of the
i) Does the parent use the property of the subsidiary as its own?
j) Do the directors or executives fail to act independently in the interest of
*164 the subsidiary, and do they instead take orders from the parent, and act
in the parent’s interest?
k) Are the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary not observed?
Inter-Tel Techs., Inc. v. Linn Station Props., LLC, 360 S.W.3d 152, 163–64 (Ky.
2012) (citing FREDRICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 9 (1931);
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 41–42 (2011)).
134. Guava LLC, 2015 WL 4877851, at *4.
135. In other words, the state legislature gets to decide to what extent a thirdparty corporation might be required to relinquish financial information in
supplemental proceeding, and can set appropriate safeguards to prevent “fishing
expeditions” where no relevant evidence is likely to be discoverable.
136. Thus, the state legislature, rather than the judiciary (as was the case in New
York in Koehler, 911 N.E.2d 825), would have the right to decide whether foreign
third-party agents and bailees, such as financial institutions, should be included
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legislative amendment process can result in a potent expansion of
enforcement jurisdiction, in conjunction with statutorily mandated
due process safeguards.

V.

CONCLUSION

The benefits of allowing judgment creditors to directly attack
the fraudulent agents and transfers of judgment debtors are many,
and the potential pitfalls are surmountable with careful legislation
and interpretation. While many jurisdictions identified in this
comment have been reluctant to permit veil piercing in
supplemental proceedings (particularly those in Group 2 and
Georgia in Group 3), their hesitation can be alleviated by crafting
statutory provisions that ensure that the rights of judgment debtors
and third parties are preserved. In the end, it is up to state
legislatures to decide exactly how far to extend their enforcement
jurisdiction, and this legislative power can and should be used to
draft unambiguous provisions that promote judicial economy and
clearly delineate the rights of judgment creditors, judgment debtors,
and third parties in supplemental proceedings and postjudgment
discovery.

within the state’s jurisdiction.

